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The Harris decision that the defendant, who held the boat for two
boating seasons without seriously attempting to dispose of it, did not
act with commercial reasonableness appears to be equitable and in
accord with the decisions on point.3 ' Although it is somewhat difficult
to apply the standards of § 9-507(3) since the defendant took no
affirmative actions, it is not difficult using the standards of Old Colony
to reach the same conclusion as was reached in Harris.Considering the
short depreciation schedule of a boat, the defendant neither acted "in
good faith" nor with an effort to avoid a loss by holding the plaintiff's
boat in drydock for two years without seriously attempting to dispose
of it.
By the Harris decision Maryland has adopted the sound majority
view that commercial reasonableness must reach every aspect of the
sale. This view appears to be in harmony with the intent of the
draftsmen and the best interests of parties engaged in a commercial
undertaking.
Jon W. Brassel

CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-INFORMATION FROM
UNNAMED INFORMANT HELD TO BE RELIABLE WITHOUT ANY
DEMONSTRATION OF THE INFORMANT'S INHERENT CREDIBILITY. THOMPSON V. STATE, 16 Md. App. 560, 298 A.2d 458
(1973).
In Thompson v. State' the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
affirmed the conviction of the defendant for possession of heroin.
Based upon information obtained from an unnamed informant (which
had been given to the informant by a street seller of narcotics when he
was attempting to consumate a prearranged "buy"), 2 the police ar35. See California Airmotive Corp. v. Jones, 415 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1969) (secured party sold
repossessed collateral for $70,000 lower than the purchase price less than one year after
contract); Mercantile Fin. Corp. v. Miller, 292 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (mere price
discrepancy does not establish that a sale of collateral was not commercially reasonable);
Frontier Inv. Corp. v. Belleville Nat'l. Sav. Bank, 119 Ill. App. 2d 2, 254 N.E.2d 295 (1969)
(judicial approval of sale is conclusive of its commercial reasonableness); Family Fin.
Corp. v. Scott, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 587 (1961) (where there is a wide discrepancy between any
standard of value recognized in the trade and the sale price, there appear to be equitable
grounds for opening the deficiency judgment).
1. 16 Md. App. 560, 298 A.2d 458 (1973).
2. The street seller of narcotics, when finding himself with an insufficient supply of heroin for
sale, told his prospective purchaser (the primary informant) that heroin would be
available for purchase after a one o'clock drop by "Guy." The primary informant was able
to specify that the reference to "Guy" was a reference to the defendant.
When a primary informant is a mere conduit for hearsay information from a secondary
source, the information evaluation process of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), must
begin at the secondary level. Dawson v. State, 11 Md. App. 694. 701 n.3, 276 A.2d 680, 683
n.3 (1971), cert. denied, 263 Md. 711 (1971).
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rested the defendant in his automobile and then conducted a search of
that vehicle. The search produced the inculpatory evidence. Both parties to the action below agreed that the warrantless search of the
automobile was based on the "automobile exception" to the warrant
requirement.3 Under this exception, the constitutionality of the search
was bottomed on both the existence of exigent circumstances and
probable cause to make a valid arrest.4 The sole issue before the court,
therefore, was whether the secondary informant (the street seller) and
his information met the standards for evaluating probable cause in
hearsay information, as stated by Aguilar v. Texas.'
In Aguilar the magistrate was faced with the same evaluative process6
as were the police officers in Thompson: to determine if the information received was sufficiently reliable to furnish probable cause. The
standards the Aguilar Court used in judging the sufficiency of probable
cause derived from the hearsay information were: "[T] he magistrate
must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which
the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they
were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer
concluded that the informant ... was 'credible' or his information
'reliable.'
",.

The "credible or his information reliable" test was used in Thompson
to evaluate the hearsay information supplied by the unnamed secondary informant. However, the court, in dicta, noted a new approach in
the use of this test:
The "veracity" prong of Aguilar is . . . significantly phrased in
the disjunctive. Even knowing nothing about the inherent credibility of a source of information, we may still ask, "Was the
information furnished under circumstances giving reasonable
assurances of trustworthiness?" If so, the information is "reliable,"8 notwithstanding the ignorance as to its source's credibility.
3. 16 Md. App. at 564, 298 A.2d at 460. The parties also agreed that the credibility of the
primary informant was not in issue. Id. For a discussion of the 'automobile exception,"
see 2 BALT. L. REv. 338 (1972).
4. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
5. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
6. In Aguilar the affidavit stated that police officers had "received reliable information and
do believe [narcotics] are being kept at the above described premises." Id. at 109.
7. Id. at 114. These two standards have been respectively referred to as the "basis of
knowledge" and the "veracity" prongs of Aguilar. In Maryland the basis of knowledge
prong has been construed to require that an officer pass on to the trial judge "some of the
underyling circumstances from which the informant concluded that the evidence was
where he claimed it would be." Soles v. State, 16 Md. App. 656, 662-63, 299 A.2d 502,
506-07 (1973). The veracity prong is split into two parts. The first part measures whether
there is any information on which to posit the informant's inherent credibility. The second
or alternative part of the veracity prong (which was relied on by the Thompson court) is a
requirement that in the absence of the informer's inherent credibility, his infbrmation be
reliable. See Dawson v. State, 11 Md. App. 694, 276 A.2d 680 (1971).
8. 16 Md. App. at 566, 298 A.2d at 461. The facts of Thompson appear to support the
defendant's conviction under the holdings of Aguilar and Spinelli v. United States, 393
U.S. 410 (1969). This language set forth by the Thompson court to rationalize its holding
does not appear to be consistent with the guidelines set by Aguilar and Spinelli.

19731

Recent Developments

The Thompson court decided that because the secondary informant
was a street seller of narcotics, he was a merchant and was passing on
information (to the primary informant) that was "replete with assurances of trustworthiness." 9 By this language the Court of Special
Appeals appeared to conclude that the street seller, in his attempt to
assure the return of his prospective purchaser, was giving (to that
customer) reliable information. The court reasoned that the vendorvendee relationship was sufficient to demonstrate the reliability of the
information without a need to demonstrate the credibility of the
secondary source.' 0 This interpretation by the Thompson court does
not appear to be consistent with the constitutional requirements enunciated in Aquilar, Spinelli v. United States,' ' and other cases of the
Supreme Court dealing with hearsay information. 1 2
In Spinelli, the Court explicated the Aquilar guidelines in regard to
the "or his information reliable" (second) aspect of the veracity
An FBI investigation was conducted that confirmed an unprong.'
named informant's tip as being factually correct, but the Court held
that such factual verification was, in that case, subject to an ambivalent
interpretation and could not be used to satisfy the Aquilar requirements. The Spinelli Court reasoned that Aquilar had phrased the
veracity prong in the disjunctive so as to give the officer who was
unable to supply the magistrate with information about the inherent
credibility of his informant an opportunity to demonstrate reliability in
another manner (police verification of an informant's information).'"
Spinelli further noted that absent detailed information concerning
the informant's credibility (trustworthiness), more than simply a "totality of circumstances" approach must be taken by a magistrate issuing a
warrant.' s In the same vein, the police officer in Thompson conducted
a personal verification of the primary informant's tip; however, the
officer in Thompson was not an issuing magistrate, but a police officer
observing what he believed to be criminal activity.' 6 Such an officer
would arguably have a practical advantage over a magistrate in that he is
not confined to information contained in an affidavit, but that officer
still cannot adopt a "totality of circumstances" approach in making his
own determination of probable cause. Even a warrantless search has
been held to be subject to at least the same standards as a search with a
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

14.
15.
16.

16 Md. App. at 568, 298 A.2d at 462.
Id. at 567, 298 A.2d at 462.
393 U.S. 410 (1969).
See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300
(1967); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
393 U.S. at 412-13. Spinelli also has been used to supply an alternative method for
satisfaction of the basis of knolwedge prong. Independent police investigations can be used
to satisfy a magistrate that the informant properly arrived at his conclusion and that his
tip was factually correct. See Soles v. State, 16 Md. App. 656, 299 A.2d 502 (1973). In the
context of the textual discussion above, the examination of Spinelli has been confined
solely to its effect upon the second aspect of the veracity prong.
Id. at 415-17.
Id.
Brief for State at 4-5, Thompson v. State, 16 Md. App. 560, 298 A.2d 458 (1973).
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warrant in the case of determining probable cause based on hearsay
information.' "
Another method used to satisfy the second aspect of the Aquilar
veracity prong was demonstrated by the Supreme Court in Draper v.
United States.' s In this pre-Aquilar decision, the Draper court was
presented with a comprehensive tip as to the activities and characteristics of the defendant. The issuing magistrate, however, was not given
information as to how the informant came by his information or why
he should be trusted. Because the officer in Draper was able to verify a
substantial portion of the informant's extremely comprehensive tip, the
warrant was upheld, as the officer "had reasonable grounds to believe
the remaining unverified bit [of the information] was likewise true."' '
Such a comprehensive tip does not appear to have been before the
court in Thompson; if a tip similar to the one in Draper had been
presented, it would have contributed greatly towards satisfying the
second aspect of the veracity prong in that it would have lent reliability
to the informant's information.
A recent decision dealing with hearsay information as a basis for a
warrant is United States v. Harris,2
where the underlying circumstances upon which the informant based his conclusion were demonstrated, but the informant's credibility was in dispute. In Harris the
informant had supplied the police with information that the defendant
was a trafficker in non-tax-paid distilled spirits. The warrant affidavit
recited that the informant had personally purchased illicit whiskey
from the defendant, and that the informant had personal knowledge
that the defendant kept the whiskey in his residence. However, the
affidavit did not supply any details about the informant's credibility, it
merely stated that he was a "prudent person. '"2
The plurality opinion of the Harris Court held that the information
was reliable because the informer had declared against his penal interest
and had made these declarations in fear of his life.2 2 The Court
reasoned that, absent information as to the inherent credibility of the
informant, the special circumstances of this case indicated informational reliability. However, these special circumstances distinguish the
case from Thompson, where the secondary informant was unaware that
he was dealing with a person who was cooperating with the police. As
noted above, the Thompson court relied on no more than the vendor17. See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
18. 358 U.S. 307 (1959). Draper, like Spinelli has also been used to supply an alternative
method for satisfaction of the basis of knowledge prong. Self-verifying information can be
used to satisfy the magistrate that the informant properly arrived at his conclusion and
that the tip was factually correct. See Buckner v. State, 11 Md. App. 55, 272 A.2d 828
(1971), cert. denied, 261 Md. 723 (1971). In the context of the textual discussion above, the
examination of Draper has been confined solely to its effect upon the second aspect of the
veracity prong.
19. 358 U.S. at 313.
20. 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
21. Id.at 575.
22. Id.at 583-84.
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vendee relationship to posit the secondary informant's informational
reliability and this relationship was not such as to be analogous to the
Harrisfactual situation for finding probable cause.
Past Supreme Court decisions support the Thompson statement that
the Aquilar veracity prong is phrased in the disjunctive; however, unlike
the Thompson dicta,2 3 the Supreme Court has applied the second
aspect of the veracity prong only under the happening of special
circumstances, such as the decisions of Draper (where the Court found
informational reliability from self-verifying information), Spinelli
(where the Court found informational reliability was demonstrated by
an independent police investigation, although in Spinelli the investigation was not sufficient to satisfy the Court) and Harris (where the
Court found informational reliability from the nature of the informant's confession to a crime).
The departure of Thompson from the rationale of the Supreme
Court occurred when the court concluded: "The circumstances in
which the seller passed on the information to a customer and confidant
are replete . . . with assurances of trustworthiness." ' ' As set forth
above, this rationale of the Thompson dicta2 s is based on a reasoning
that the relative positions of the primary and secondary informants led
to another special circumstance which allowed an exception to the
traditional Aquilar test. However, this position of Thompson, as yet not
before the Supreme Court, would seem to extend the parameters of
Aquilar to a position of questionable solidity.
The Maryland interpretation of the Aquilar standard for measuring
hearsay information was delineated in Dawson v. State.2 6 In Dawson
the court sustained the defendants' conviction for unlawfully maintaining premises for the purpose of selling lottery tickets and for gambling
on a horse race. Inculpatory evidence was found during a search
pursuant to a warrant, which was based upon confidential hearsay
information given to a police officer. In addition to this information,
the police officer affiant observed one of the defendants engaged in
suspicious activity, which was not in itself conclusive of bookmaking
activity.
Dawson pointed out that based on an interpretation of Aquilar and
Spinelli "probable cause may be based upon a combination of direct
obser-vation and hearsay information." 2 7 When evaluating hearsay information buttressed by independent observation, the Dawson court set
forth four possible conclusions:
(1) That the direct observation is adequate unto itself to establish probable cause ....
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

16 Md. App. at 566-67, 298 A.2d at 461.
Id. at 568, 298 A.2d at 462.
Id. at 566-67, 298 A.2d at 461.
11 Md. App. 694, 276 A.2d 680 (1971).
Id. at 697, 276 A.2d at 681.
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(2) That the hearsay information is adequate unto itself to
establish probable cause ....
(3) That neither the direct observation nor the hearsay information, standing alone, is adequate to establish probable cause
but that the two combined do add up to the establishment of
such probable cause ....
(4) That even the sum total of the direct observation plus the
hearsay information does not establish probable cause .... 2 8
Although Dawson recognized that both the credibility of a person
and the reliability of his information must be judged by the Aquilar
standards,2 the court used the concurring opinion of Justice White in
Spinelli as authority for the conclusion that:
To conclude that trustworthiness is probably present [the veracity prong], the magistrate must be convinced either 1) that the
source himself is inherently honest and credible or 2) in the
absence of such proof of the character of the man, that the
information is furnished by that source under circumstances
redolent with assurances of trustworthiness [or his information
reliable] .3
Dawson thus provided the foundation for the Thompson court to
conclude that because the circumstances of the buy were "replete ...
with assurances of trustworthiness"' ' the information was reliable.
Dawson further noted that "the necessary trustworthiness may [be]
established extrinsicly by ... independent verification" but, like the
Thompson court, the Dawson court failed to point out that independent verification was the "or his information reliable" aspect of the
veracity prong, not "circumstances redolent with assurances of trustworthiness."
In Moore v. State3 2 a search was based on a combination of hearsay
information and direct observations by a police officer. The court
found that the inherent credibility of the informants was not demonstrated and, using the standard of Dawson, that there was no indication
that the information had been furnished "under circumstances reasonably insuring trustworthiness." However, the court noted that the
search for the veracity prong need not stop at that point and found that
the police officer's observations were sufficient to corroborate a substantial part of the informant's story to satisfy the Draper test; thus
there was an adequate showing of informational reliability. 3
The court here used Draper to bolster informational reliability but,
as in Dawson, the Moore court subscribed incorrectly to the theory that
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 702, 276 A.2d at 684.
Id. at 699, 276 A.2d at 682.
Id. at 699-700, 276 A.2d at 682.
16 Md.App. at 568, 298 A.2d at 462.
13 Md. App. 711, 284 A.2d 614 (1971).
Id. at 719-20, 284 A.2d at 618-19.
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the "or his information reliable" aspect of the veracity prong could be
satisfied "by circumstances reasonably insuring trustworthiness." As in
Dawson, Moore correctly related the Spinelli and Draper tests to the
second aspect of the veracity prong, but both Maryland cases used an
intermediate step prior to the use of Spinelli and Draper that was not
part of the Supreme Court guidelines.
As the opinion in Thompson indicates, the court interpreted the
information of the secondary informant as if that information had
originated from one not within the criminal milieu. The court reasoned
that because the secondary informant (the street seller) was not "wittingly" working with the police, he could be trusted.3 4 The court
concluded that the criminal-informant was trustworthy by predicting
what it believed would be the usual or commercial relations to one
selling narcotics.
Maryland cases dealing with informants not from within the criminal
milieu have held that those informants need not be proven credible
because their credibility is posited from their position in society. 3 ' One
such case is Lomax v. State,3 6 where the court decided that the
supervisor of an apartment complex was "presumptively truthful"
when he relayed information to the police based upon the complaints
of several tenants about the narcotics activities of another tenant.
Another such case in accord with Lomax is the Maryland case of Kraft
v. State,3 where the court noted that:
The credibility of an unnamed informant is at best, suspect.
Where . .. the informers are not shown to be reliable, and there
are no legally competent facts, circumstances or observations to
add to their information, we cannot say that a prudent and
cautious man would be justified in finding probable cause to
believe that an offense was being committed .... 3
The very logic of cases such as Lomax and Kraft-that a citizen should
have a form of inherent credibility-would seem to argue against extending such a quality to an individual unquestionably from the criminal milieu, the street seller of narcotics in Thompson.
The Maryland cases considered thus far have dealt with a judgment
of probable cause by the issuing magistrate who must rely in part on
hearsay information from unnamed informants. The Thompson court
applied the tests to be used by such a magistrate to a situation where
there was independent action by a police officer. It has been held that
34. 16 Md. App. at 568, 298 A.2d at 462.
35. See, e.g., Lomax v. State, 16 Md. App. 502, 298 A.2d 454 (1972); Evans v. State, 11 Md.
App. 451. 274 A.2d 653 (1971), cert. denied, 262 Md. 746 (1971): Knight v. State, 7 Md.
App. 282, 254 A.2d 379 (1969).
36. 16 Md. App. at 502, 298 A.2d at 454 (1972).
37. 16 Md. App. 347, 297 A.2d 328 (1972). rev'd on other grounds, Md. -, 307 A.2d 683
(1973).
38. Id. at 352, 297 A.2d at 331.
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and that
warrantless searches are subject to the Aquilar guidelines
these searches require more persuasive evidence to justify them than
would be needed to justify the issuance of a warrant. 4 0
The Maryland case of Hundley v.State4 ' held that when the state
has the burden of proving a warrantless search, the trial court must be
informed as to why the officer determined that the informant's information was reliable. 4 2 This has been further interpreted by the Maryland courts to mean that the officer must supply information as to why
he concluded that the "informant was credible or his information
reliable." 4
In Thompson the action of the officer fulfilled the Spinelli requirements because by personal observation the officer was able to conclude
that the informant's tip was accurate and reliable and thus gave a
sufficient basis for probable cause. The officer did not conclude that
the information was given under reasonable assurances of trustworthiness or that it was replete with assurances of trustworthiness; rather, he
used the requirements of Spinelli to show informational reliability. The
trial court (and the Court of Special Appeals) was thus presented with a
case similar to Hundley.4 4 This distinction between Thompson and the
accepted method by which a police officer is to conduct a warrantless
arrest and rationalize it to the court appears to add weight to the
argument against the adoption of the Thompson rationale by future
Maryland courts.
Other jurisdictions that have reviewed the Aquilar standards have
also had to decide what the Supreme Court intended by the wording of
the second part of the veracity prong. 4 ' In Commonwealth v. Eazer4'6
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania was presented with a situation
where a police officer (dressed in plain clothes) went to a newstand and
overheard a phone conversation that appeared to involve the placing of
bets. The officer confronted the caller and was told that the bets were
being given to one "Joe" and that the officer was welcome to place bets
at that time everyday. The officer then proceeded to place a bet with
the informant, and he observed other bets being placed through the
informant to the defendant. The Pennsylvania court, in upholding the
warrant, noted that notwithstanding the absence of any information
39. See generally McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
40. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Hignut v. State, 17 Md. App. 399, 303 A.2d
173 (1973).
41. 3 Md. App. 402, 239 A.2d 593 (1967), cert. denied, 251 Md. 750 (1968).
42. Id. at 405, 239 A.2d at 595. Accord, Bolesta v. State, 9 Md. App. 408, 264 A.2d 878 (1970);
Watkins v. State, 7 Md. App. 151, 253 A.2d 925 (1969), cert. denied, 256 Md. 749 (1969);
Mullaney v. State, 5 Md. App. 248, 246 A.2d 291 (1967), cert. denied, 252 Md. 732 (1969).
43. 9 Md. App. at 412, 264 A.2d at 880.
44. Accord, Bolesta v. State, 9 Md. App. 408, 264 A.2d 878 (1970); Watkins v. State, 7 Md.
App. 151, 253 A.2d 925 (1969); Mullaney v. State, 5 Md. App. 248, 246 A.2d 291 (1967).
45. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Eazer, 223 Pa. Super. 501, 302 A.2d 354 (1973); State v.
Collins, 112 N.H. 449, 298 A.2d 742 (1972); Commonwealth v. Stevens, - Mass...,
283 N.E.2d 673 (1973).
46. 223 Pa. Super. 501, 302 A.2d 354 (1973).
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concerning the informant's inherent credibility, the police officer's
actions here corroborated the informant's
tip and satisfied the "or his
4 7
information reliable" aspect of Aquilar.
In State v. Collins,4 8 a New Hampshire decision, police received an
anonymous telephone tip that stated, with intricate detail, the activities
and appearance of the defendant, a narcotics seller. The police through
their investigation found that the defendant had been participating in
suspicious activities. The court held that even absent information concerning the inherent credibility of the unnamed informant, the independent corroborative investigation combined with the detail of the tip
"furnished a basis for a determination as to the ... reliability of [the]
information." 4
For its support of the interpretation of the Aquilar
guidelines, the New Hampshire court relied on Spinelli and Draper.5
The decisions from these two states, along with others,' ' indicate
that the Aquilar guidelines have not been interpreted by other jurisdictions to include "replete with assurances of trustworthiness" where
there is no information given as to the inherent credibility of the
informant. Decisions such as Eazer demonstrate that most state courts
are content to view the veracity prong in a manner consistent with the
guidelines set by Aquilar and Spinelli.
As noted above, the Aquilar veracity prong has not been extended to
the limits envisaged by the Thompson court in its dicta.' 2 The second
aspect of that prong has been used by the Supreme Court only in cases
similar to the Spinelli, Draper, and Harris decisions. What becomes
questionable from a reading of Thompson is the way in which that
court, when presented with a Spinelli corroboration to certify informational reliability, chose to ignore that certification and to extend the
limits of the veracity prong beyond those delineated by the Supreme
Court.
The Thompson extension is a new twist to using the Supreme Court
guidelines and appears to be an extension inconsistent with the constitutional intent found in Aquilar and Spinelli. While the second aspect
of the veracity prong has been available for use since 1964, it has only
been rarely extended to incorporate something different than the
pre-Aquilar,Draper decision; only with Spinelli and Harris has the court
extended the second part of Aquilar's veracity prong.
State's attorneys should be reticent in using the Thompson dicta 3
in future cases dealing with the judgment of information gleaned from
unnamed informants to establish probable cause. This caution would
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 504, 302 A.2d at 355-56.
112 N.H. 449, 298 A.2d 742 (1972).
Id. at 452, 298 A.2d at 745.
Id. at 452, 298 A.2d at 744-45.
Cf. State v. Lindquist, __
Minn. __,
205 N.W.2d 333 (1973); see, e.g., In Re One
Peterbilt Tractor, 84 N.M. 652, 506 P.2d 1199 (1973); People v. Parker, 42 Ill.
2d 42, 245
N.E.2d 487 (1968), as modified on denial of rehearing (1969).
52. 16 Md. App. at 566-67, 298 A.2d at 461.
53. Id.
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appear to be particularly applicable in cases where no effort has been
made by police officers to secure a warrant or to independently
corroborate the information.
In Thompson the facts fit the mold of Spinelli; therefore, the holding
appears to be well founded. However, the Thompson variation, while
minor, is still one that might lead to a major deprivation of a defendant's fourth amendment rights. Since the reliability of an unnamed
criminal informant is at best suspect, if his information is to be used, it
should be subjected to the rigid tests dictated by Aquilar and Spinelli.
Steven Aaron Allen

FEDERAL TAXATION-TAXPAYER HELD TO HAVE BENEFICIAL
INTEREST AND TO QUALIFY FOR DEPRECIATION DEDUCTION
WHERE HE MADE LITTLE INVESTMENT AND INCURRED NO
LIABILITY AS MAJORITY SHAREHOLDER OF A CORPORATION
AND TRANSFEREE SUBSEQUENT TO PURCHASE-LEASE BACK
AND MORTGAGE AGREEMENTS. BOLGER V. COMMISSIONER,
59 T.C. 760 (1973).
May a corporation be created to buy industrial property, lease the
property back to the seller, mortgage the property using the lease as
security and then convey the property to the incorporator thus providing a liability free depreciation deduction to that taxpayer?
The Tax Court answered yes in Bolger v. Commissioner.' There the
court approved a scheme which allowed the taxpayer and his associates
to hold commercial property with most of the advantages and few of
the headaches. The court considered two basic issues: (1) whether the
financing corporation is a separate viable entity or merely a conduit for
the property owner; and (2) if the corporate entity is recognized,
whether the taxpayer acquires a depreciable interest from it. An affirmative answer was given to both by application of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 (the "Code"), § 167, allowing depreciation for property
used in trade or business to the taxpayer, and § 1011, adjusting the
basis by including an unpaid mortgage balance. The Tax Court held that
despite the circuitous land transactions divesting the corporation of its
sole assets, it engaged in sufficient business activity to be recognized as
a viable entity.2 The taxpayer was entitled to a depreciable interest in
the property because he and the other transferees had acquired legal
title and the beneficial ownership by virtue of the transfer. The outstanding debt obligation of the mortgage was recognized by the court as
1. 59 T.C. 760 (1973).
2. Id.at 766.

